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ABSTRACT
Entrepreneurs starting new ﬁrms face two sorts of asymmetric information problems. In-
formation about the quality of new investments may be private, leading to adverse selection
in credit markets. And, entrepreneurs may not observe the quality of workers applying
for jobs, resulting in adverse selection in labor markets. We construct a simple model to
illustrate some consequences of new ﬁrms facing both sorts of asymmetric information.
Multiple equilibria can occur. Stable equilibria can be in the interior, or at a corner in
which no entrepreneurs enter. Stable interior equilibria can involve involuntary unemploy-
ment, as well as credit rationing. Equilibrium outcomes mismatch workers to ﬁrms, and
will generally result in an ineﬃcient number of new ﬁrms. With involuntary unemploy-
ment, there will be too few new ﬁrms, but with full employment, there may be too many
or too few. Taxes or subsidies on new ﬁrms and employment can be used to achieve a
second-best optimum. Alternative information assumptions are explored.
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New ﬁrms and the entrepreneurs that initiate them are beset by problems of asymmetric
information with respect to their prospects for success, as well as with respect to the quality
of labor they are able to hire and their ability to obtain credit on good terms. The fact
that new entrepreneurs are to a large extent indistinguishable from one another means that
creditors are unable to tailor ﬁnancial terms to entrepreneurs’ project qualities. As well,
since they are hiring workers for the ﬁrst time, they do not have the experience to discern
the quality of potential workers and whether they will be a good match for the particular
projects being initiated. This puts new ﬁrms at a signiﬁcant disadvantage with respect to
existing ﬁrms whose track records have been proven, who may have internal ﬁnance, and
who have had a chance to sort out good or suitable workers from bad or unsuitable ones.
These problems naturally lead to the question of whether public policies should actively
encourage the entry of new entrepreneurial ﬁrms. That is the focus of this paper.
The literature has recognized in a piecemeal way some of the problems that new ﬁrms
face due to asymmetric information, and has come to some surprising results. The seminal
paper of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) studied the adverse selection problems that arise when
banks are unable to distinguish high- from low-quality projects and must oﬀer the same
ﬁnancial terms to all. In their case, the expected return could be observed, but not the
riskiness of individual projects of a given expected return. In this setting, too few projects
would be ﬁnanced—those with the highest risk—suggesting a subsidy on the ﬁnancing
of new ﬁrms. Moreover, the possibility of credit rationing existed which exacerbated the
underinvestment. Subsequently, de Meza and Webb (1987) considered the case in which
banks could observe ex post project returns but not the probability of success. In this
setting, the ﬁndings of Stiglitz and Weiss were reversed: there would be overinvestment
in low-probability projects and no possibility of credit rationing, leading to a presumption
of taxing new ﬁrms. These results have been generalized by Boadway and Keen (2005)
to allow for more general patterns of project characteristics in the pool, and to allow for
alternative forms of ﬁnance. What emerges is a general presumption of overinvestment as
1low-risk investments opt for debt ﬁnance and high-risk ones for equity ﬁnance.1
Asymmetric information has also been the focus of the venture capital (VC) literature
where the ﬁnancing of new entrepreneurs is combined with managerial advice. Here, the
emphasis has been more on moral hazard problems associated with the eﬀort of both the VC
and the entrepreneur. Keuschnigg and Neilsen (2003) have argued that these moral hazard
problems can be addressed by a tax on new ﬁrms combined with a reduced capital gains
tax. Dietz (2002) has added adverse selection to the VC problem and allowed entrepreneurs
to choose between VC ﬁnancing (with managerial advice) and bank ﬁnancing. He ﬁnds
that high-risk projects choose the former and low-risk projects the latter, but that too
many low-risk projects end up being ﬁnanced by VCs.
There has been a limited amount of attention paid to the consequences for new ﬁrms
of imperfect information on other markets. Weiss (1980) considers the case of adverse
selection in labor markets when ﬁrms cannot observe the quality of workers they hire. He
shows that workers will tend to be drawn from the bottom of the skill distribution—since a
common wage is paid regardless of quality—and too few will be hired. Moreover, there is a
possibility of excess labor supply, or involuntary unemployment, in equilibrium. A subsidy
on employment would be welfare-improving in this context. The Weiss model focuses en-
tirely on adverse selection in labor markets: there is no heterogeneity of entrepreneurs and
there is no uncertainty of project success. Presumably other forms of asymmetric infor-
mation in labor markets would particularly aﬀect new ﬁrms as well, such as unobservable
eﬀort (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) or search problems (Diamond, 1982).
There are potentially many other ways in which the entry of new ﬁrms is rendered inef-
ﬁcient because of asymmetric information or externalities. Some of these include signaling
problems, knowledge externalities, and strategic barriers to entry. The potential conse-
quences of various sources of ineﬃciency for tax policy toward new ﬁrms are surveyed in
broad terms in Boadway and Tremblay (2005). Rosen (2005) reviews the empirical eﬀects
of existing policies on entrepreneurship in the United States.
1 This overinvestment result is in sharp contrast to the consequences of asymmetric information
for already existing ﬁrms. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that managers of existing ﬁrms
will pass up good projects when new equity ﬁnance is used if insiders have more information
about the value of a ﬁrm’s projects that outside investors.
2Our purpose is to study how adverse selection in both credit markets and labor mar-
kets aﬀects equilibrium and eﬃciency in the formation of new ﬁrms, and to consider the
consequences for policy. To do so, we develop a simple but rather speciﬁc model designed
to capture the main features of information asymmetry facing new ﬁrms, while at the
same time avoiding needless complications. This asymmetry is two-sided: potential en-
trepreneurs do not know quality of individual workers, and workers do not know quality,
or ability, of new entrepreneurs. And, banks and governments know neither.
The model we use builds on the one used by de Meza and Webb (1987) to study
adverse selection in credit markets by adding an employment dimension. Entrepreneurs
of varying ability each hire a ﬁxed number of workers who are of varying quality. If
successful, an entrepreneur’s ﬁrm produces a ﬁxed output, where the possibility of success
depends jointly on the ability of entrepreneurs and the quality of workers. Entrepreneurs
have no initial wealth, so must rely on credit to ﬁnance their operations. Equilibrium
will involve the best entrepreneurs hiring workers randomly from the set of lowest-quality
workers. There will be several sorts of ineﬃciencies in this context. Workers of diﬀerent
qualities will be mismatched with entrepreneurs of diﬀerent ability. Neither labor markets
nor credit markets may clear: there may be involuntary unemployment or credit rationing.
And, there will be an ineﬃcient number of entrepreneurs, either too many or too few
depending on the nature of the equilibrium outcome. This will lead to the possibility of
eﬃciency-enhancing policy intervention.
The basic model is outlined in the following section, and the full-information equilibria
in Section 3. This is followed by the analysis of equilibrium when the quality of workers
and the ability of entrepreneurs are both private. In Section 5, we investigate the eﬃciency
of markets outcomes under asymmetric information and the implications for policy. The
following section brieﬂy discusses alternative information assumptions in which only of one
worker quality or entrepreneurial ability is private knowledge. A ﬁnal section concludes.
32. Elements of the Model
The model we use has several speciﬁc features. They are chosen to highlight the kinds of
issues that can arise when there is asymmetric information in labor and credit markets,
while at the same time avoiding complications that can obscure the phenomena we are
trying to illustrate and can lead to excessively complex analysis. Many of our simpliﬁca-
tions parallel those found in the literature on adverse selection in credit markets, such as
the simple structure of project returns and the limitation on the number of dimensions of
decision-making. Naturally, this leads to results that are model-speciﬁc, but hopefully are
still suggestive.
The model is partial equilibrium in the sense that it focuses on the entrepreneurial
sector of the economy, that is, the sector consisting of new entrepreneurial ﬁrms. There
is a continuum of potential entrepreneurs, as well as a (separate) continuum of potential
workers.2 Entrepreneurs diﬀer in a single dimension called ability, denoted a, while workers
diﬀer by quality, denoted q,a n db o t ha and q are distributed uniformly over [0,1]. The
total population of entrepreneurs is normalized to unity, while that of workers is normalized
to n,s ot h e r ea r en workers per entrepreneur. These assumptions about the distributions
of entrepreneurs and workers are important because, as we shall see, they lead to perfect
matching of workers and entrepreneurs in the full-information outcome, thereby avoiding
the complications that arise when matching is imperfect. In fact, the supports of the two
distributions need not be the same, and are assumed to be so only for simplicity. Only a
portion of both potential entrepreneurs and workers end up choosing the entrepreneurial
sector, and those who do not have a fallback option as discussed below.
Every potential entrepreneur has a project that may either be successful or unsuccess-
ful. Success occurs with probability p and yields a return R,w h e r eR is ﬁxed exogenously
and is the same for all projects. If the project fails, zero revenue is obtained (R =0 ) . 3 To
2 An alternative approach would be to assume that entrepreneurs and workers come from the
same population, as in Kanbur (1981) for example, and discussed in de Meza (2002). In
our approach, diﬀerences in attributes of entrepreneurs and workers play a key role, and
it simpliﬁes matters to abstract from the possibility that individuals may possess various
amounts of each attribute. This would add an occupational choice dimension to our analysis
that would complicate things considerably.
3 These assumptions are equivalent to the de Meza and Webb (1987) case, as opposed to the
4undertake a project, each entrepreneur hires n workers, taken to be ﬁxed for simplicity.
The probability of success of a project p depends upon both the ability of the entrepreneur
a and the qualities of the n workers hired, q ≡ (q1,···,q n), according to:4
(1) p(a,q)=βaqα, 0 <β ,α<1
where qα is the average value of qα.B o t h a and q may be private information to the
entrepreneur or the worker respectively. Moreover, neither can be inferred ex post since
all that might be observed is whether the project has succeeded or failed and not the
probability of success.
When a project is undertaken, each worker is paid a wage up front, and for simplicity
wage costs are the only costs to the entrepreneurs. Let c denote total wage costs. En-
trepreneurs are assumed to have no wealth so the amount c must be obtained from the
credit market.5 We assume credit takes the form of a loan extended by a bank at a gross
interest rate of r (i.e., one plus the market interest rate). If the project is successful,
the entrepreneur repays rc to the bank. Otherwise, the ﬁrm goes bankrupt and the bank
receives no payment. We assume that banks can costlessly observe whether the project
succeeds or fails. Since it would be in the interest of entrepreneurs to declare bankruptcy
even if the project is successful, it may be more realistic to require that banks monitor
project returns ex post in the event of such a declaration. Adding an ex post monitoring
cost would not change the results, so we leave it out for simplicity. Some consequences
of ex post monitoring costs when new ﬁrms face adverse selection in credit markets are
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) case where expected returns on projects are the same, or Boadway
and Keen (2005) where projects are distributed over both R and the probability of success
p. Allowing returns to be greater than zero in the bad outcome would be inconsequential,
provided the bad return leads to bankruptcy.
4 Alternatively, (1) could be written p(a,q)=βaqα,w h e r eq is the average value of q in the
ﬁrm. The two forms are equivalent for large n, but (1) leads to simpler analytics without
aﬀecting the results. It could also be generalized so that p(a,q)=βaγqα, but this would
not have a qualitative eﬀect on the results. An alternative approach would be to allow the
quality of workers to aﬀect the return R rather than the probability of success, as in Weiss
(1980). This also leads to qualitatively similar results.
5 Adding a ﬁxed capital cost that must be ﬁnanced by credit, as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
and de Meza and Webb (1987), adds nothing of substance in our context since credit is
already required to ﬁnance wage costs.
5discussed in Boadway and Keen (2005).
All agents—entrepreneurs, workers and banks—are assumed to be risk-neutral. Po-
tential entrepreneurs choose whether or not to undertake a project. Those who do not
undertake their project have a perfectly certain alternative income, denoted π0.T h ee x -
pected proﬁt of the project to an active entrepreneur is then:
(2) π = p(a,q)(R − rc)  π0
where p(a,q) is determined by (1) and π0 is assumed to be the same for all entrepreneurs.
The marginal entrepreneur will be the one with ability a such that (2) holds with equality.
In the credit market, banks are perfectly competitive. Let ρ be the risk-free gross rate
of return that banks must pay to their depositors. If banks know the probability of success
p of a given project—that is, they know the ability of the entrepreneur and the quality of
the worker as in the full-information case—they will in equilibrium charge a gross interest




However, if p for individual entrepreneurs is not known, banks will charge a common gross




where p is the expected probability of success of entrepreneurs who obtain bank ﬁnance.
Workers can seek employment either in the entrepreneurial sector or in a ‘traditional’
sector, where there is full information and no uncertainty. To allow for the possibility
of unemployment, we assume that there is ex post immobility between the two sectors:
a worker who chooses to seek employment in the entrepreneurial sector cannot move to
the traditional sector in the same period if a job is not obtained. Those who opt for the
traditional sector produce an output equal to their quality q for certain and earn a wage
6 This assumes that there are no operating costs for banks and that banks need not monitor
projects ex post to verify that bankruptcy has in fact occurred. As mentioned, monitoring
costs would have no qualitative eﬀect on the results.
6equal to q. There is no need for loan intermediation in the traditional sector since wage
payments are perfectly certain and there is no bankruptcy. However, in the entrepreneurial
sector, there may be asymmetric information in the sense that entrepreneurs cannot observe
the quality of workers they hire. In this case, following Weiss (1980), all those who are
employed in the entrepreneurial sector earn the same wage w despite their quality, and
the cost of workers per ﬁrm is c = nw.N o t e t h a t i f q is private information, workers
cannot observe the quality of other employees of the same entrepreneur. We assume that
n is large enough that each worker in a ﬁrm takes as given qα, and therefore the expected
probability of success of the ﬁrm.
As we shall see, when worker quality q cannot be observed there may be involuntary
unemployment, in which case jobs are ﬁlled randomly from those who have opted for
that sector. Let e be the proportion of workers in the entrepreneurial sector who become
employed. Then, given risk neutrality, workers will seek work in the entrepreneurial sector
only if the following reservation constraint is satisﬁed:
(5) ew  q
where e  1. Let ˜ q be the quality of workers who are just indiﬀerent between the tra-
ditional and the entrepreneurial sectors, so ˜ q = ew. All workers with q  ˜ q enter the
entrepreneurial sector, so the number of workers in the entrepreneurial sector, given the
uniform distribution assumed, is n˜ q. This result that the lowest quality workers enter the
entrepreneurial sector only applies when worker quality cannot be observed. As we shall
see, higher-quality workers will generally be attracted to the entrepreneurial sector when
q is observable by entrepreneurs. This constitutes one important source of ineﬃciency
induced by asymmetric information.
We have assumed that worker remuneration takes the form of a wage paid up front.
However, in principle, payments to workers could include an ex post bonus paid in the event
of success. If worker quality cannot be observed, the use of a two-part wage consisting of
an up-front wage and an ex post bonus might potentially be used to separate workers by
quality. However, an ex post bonus will not be useful under the informational assumptions
we are making. To see this, suppose b is an ex post bonus paid by an entrepreneur in the
7second period. Then, the cost to the entrepreneur of hiring a worker measured in terms
of second period income is c = rw + b = r(w + b/r), where r = ρ/p by (4). Workers
cannot be separated according to their qualities with the use of an ex post bonus since
each of them takes p to be given.7 Each of them will discount the second-period bonus
payment at the rate r  = ρ /p,w h e r eρ   ρ, with the inequality applying if workers are
liquidity-constrained. Then, for the marginal worker, we have ˜ q = e · (w + b/r ). Using












Given that r   r, the ﬁrm would never gain by using a bonus.
In what follows, our analysis focuses mainly on two cases, the benchmark full-
information case in which both a and q are public information, and the asymmetric-
information case in which both are private information. As we shall see, while the former
is fully eﬃcient, the latter is generally not even constrained eﬃcient, thereby motivating
policy intervention. In a later section, we brieﬂy discuss the intermediate cases where
either a or q is public information.
3. Equilibrium and Optimality with Full Information
With full information, both the ability of each entrepreneur and the quality of each worker
is known to all agents, including the government. Equilibrium is characterized ﬁrst by
the set of potential entrepreneurs and workers who choose to enter the entrepreneurial
sector, and second by the assignment of workers to entrepreneurs. The nature of the
equilibrium outcome depends on the parameters of the problem as well as the return R.
For concreteness, we shall focus on a particular case: that in which the highest-quality
workers opt for the entrepreneurial sector, although it is possible that the set of workers
choosing the entrepreneurial sector may be in the interior of the quality distribution. The
lowest-quality workers will go to the traditional sector since the probability of success
7 If there were few enough workers at a ﬁrm such that each one recognized the eﬀect of their
quality on p, it might be possible to use a bonus to separate workers by quality. In a
background paper, we studied this possibility for the extreme case in which each ﬁrm hires
only one worker. See Boadway and Sato (2005).
8will be too low in the entrepreneurial sector. For example, no entrepreneur would hire a
worker with q =0 ,s i n c ep = 0 in that case. (The highest-ability entrepreneurs will always
enter the sector.) In the case where the highest-quality workers enter, the nature of the
equilibrium outcome is intuitive.
Consider ﬁrst the optimal matching of workers by quality with entrepreneurs by ability.
The probability of success for a type-a entrepreneur employing a set of workers q is p(a,q)=
βaqα,w h e r ea and each element of q are public information, and therefore qα and p are
known to the workers and the banks. For a given distribution of worker qualities and
entrepreneurial abilities in the entrepreneurial sector, aggregate expected output will be
highest if higher-quality workers are matched with higher-ability entrepreneurs. To see
this, consider two entrepreneurs of ability a2 >a 1 and two sets of workers, q
1 and q
2,
whose qualities are such that qα
2 > qα
1.T h u s ,w o r k e r sq
2 are of higher quality than q
1 in
the sense that their average value of qα is higher. Expected output will be highest if qα
2
is matched with a2,a n dqα










Extending this logic to many types of entrepreneurs, output will be maximized by matching
the highest-quality workers with the highest-ability entrepreneurs. In our context where
the distributions of entrepreneurs and workers are uniform, and there are n workers for each
entrepreneur, matching will be perfect. Each entrepreneur will hire n workers of identical
quality, and workers of higher quality will be matched with entrepreneurs of higher ability.
Next, consider how the market might generate such an outcome. With full informa-
tion, wage rates will be speciﬁc to workers’ abilities, so there will be no adverse selection
and no involuntary unemployment (unlike in the asymmetric-information case as we shall
see in the next section). Therefore, there will be an equal number of workers and jobs in
the entrepreneurial sector (n per entrepreneur). Given that the densities of q and a are
identical by assumption, we might expect that the full-information equilibrium will en-
tail perfect matching of workers to entrepreneurs with q increasing in a.M o r e o v e r ,i ft h e
highest-ability entrepreneurs and the highest-quality workers are the ones that opt for the
entrepreneurial sector, which is the case we shall assume, the matching outcome will imply
9q = a since the upper support of both distributions is the same. We proceed by showing
that q = a is in fact an equilibrium in the full-information case when both entrepreneurs
and workers are drawn from the top of their respective distributions. The cutoﬀ ability of
active entrepreneurs will then be determined by a zero-net-expected-proﬁt condition, and
since each entrepreneur hires n workers, that will determine the cutoﬀ quality of workers
in the entrepreneurial sector.
To see that perfect matching will be an equilibrium, suppose the wage function is
w(q), where w(q)  q to ensure participation. Consider an entrepreneur of type a,a n d
suppose that entrepreneur hires n(q) workers of type q,w h e r e
  1
0 n(q)dq = n.G i v e nt h a t
a and q are public information, the banks charge an entrepreneur-speciﬁc gross interest





Then given the wage function w(q), the entrepreneur’s expected proﬁts can be written,
using (2) and (3), as:















Entrepreneurs choose their mix of workers to maximize expected proﬁts, given the wage
function w(q).
Suppose the wage function w(q) determined by the market for workers is convex, so
w  (q)  0. We shall conﬁrm below that this will be the case in equilibrium. Then, the
following lemma applies:8
Lemma 1: If w  (q)  0, then entrepreneur a prefers to hire all n workers of the same
quality q∗:
n∗(q)=n for q = q∗
8 Proof: Expected proﬁts in (6) may be written π = βaRE[qα] − ρnE[w(q)]. Then since
E[qα] <E [q]α for α<1a n dE[w(q)]  w(E[q]) for w  (q)  0, we have π = βaRE[qα] −
ρnE[w(q)] <β a R E [q]α − ρnw (E[q]). Therefore, starting in a situation in which workers
of diﬀerent qualities are hired, the entrepreneur can increase proﬁts by replacing them with
n workers of a type equal to the average quality of existing workers, q = E[q], since then
expected proﬁts will be βaRE[q]α − ρnw (E[q]).
10n∗(q)=0 f o r q  = q∗
Given that entrepreneurs all hire workers of a single quality, expected proﬁts (6) can
be rewritten
(6 ) π(a,q)=βaRqα − ρnw(q)
It must also be the case that, since there are n workers of each quality, all entrepreneurs
hire a diﬀerent quality of worker. With workers being drawn from the top of the quality
distribution, we expect that q = a will be an equilibrium. This will be so if proﬁts π(a,q)




= βaRαqα−1 − ρnw (q)=0





The second-order condition for the entrepreneur’s problem, evaluated at q = a,i s :
∂2π(a,a)
∂q2 = βaR(α − 1)αqα−2 − ρnw  (q) < 0
Since the ﬁrst term is negative, this will be satisﬁed if w    0, which by (7) is the case.
Thus, q = a is clearly a candidate for equilibrium since it can be supported by a wage
function satisfying (7).
To verify that q = a is an equilibrium, we can obtain an expression for the wage





where F is a constant of integration, whose value will be determined below. We assume
that w(q) is deﬁned over [0,1] and is a continuous function. Moreover, we assume that R
is suﬃciently large that in (7), w (q) > 1 for all workers in the entrepreneurial sector. In
fact, this will be the case if w (q) > 1 for the marginal worker, since w (q)i si n c r e a s i n gi n
11q along the wage proﬁle deﬁned by (8). This is suﬃcient to ensure that the highest-quality
workers are the ones that enter the entrepreneurial sector.
Let ˜ q be the ability of the marginal worker. Then, competition for workers will ensure
that w(˜ q)=˜ q,w h e r e˜ q is the wage rate that can be obtained in the traditional sector.9
Since w (q) > 1, w(q) >qfor all workers with q>˜ q, implying that the highest-quality
workers enter the entrepreneurial sector. (Of course, had it been the case that w (q) < 1
for the marginal worker, a segment of workers from the interior of the wage distribution
would enter.) Since, as we shall conﬁrm below, the highest-ability entrepreneurs are the
active ones, the marginal entrepreneur with lowest ability ˜ a will hire the marginal workers
˜ q. And, since the densities of the two distributions are the same, this implies that q(a)=a
so there is perfect matching. Therefore, from w(˜ q)=˜ q =˜ a, we can infer by applying (8)
for the marginal workers that F satisﬁes:




The wage proﬁle will adjust so that (9) is satisﬁed. All workers with q>˜ a will therefore
earn w(q) >qby (8) and the fact that w (q) > 1, implying that they will earn a surplus.
Consider now the entrepreneurs. The expected proﬁt of an entrepreneur of ability a
is given by: π = βaqαR − ρnw(q), where w(q) satisﬁes (8) and (9). The solution to the
entrepreneur’s ﬁrst-order condition will be q = a, and it will be unique since the second-












where F is given by (9). Since π(a)i si n c r e a s i n gi na, that implies that the marginal
entrepreneur will have the lowest ability among active entrepreneurs. The ability of the
marginal entrepreneur ˜ a is determined, using (9), by:
(10) π0 = βR˜ aα+1 − ρn˜ a
9 To see this, note that if w(˜ q) > ˜ q, a worker of slightly lower quality, say ˜ q − ε, can oﬀer to
work for a slightly lower wage. The marginal entrepreneur would then prefer to employ this
worker than one with quality ˜ q.
12All entrepreneurs with a  ˜ a will enter, and the number of active entrepreneurs, denoted
m, will be given by m =1− ˜ a.
It is apparent that this full-information equilibrium is eﬃcient. To see that, we only
have to show that ˜ a is optimal. This determines the number of active entrepreneurs and
workers, and we already know that output is maximized when matching is perfect, which



















where the ﬁrst term is the surplus obtained by entrepreneurs and the second term the
surplus of workers, both measured in terms of second-period income.10 Diﬀerentiating S





β˜ aα+1R − ρnw(˜ a) − π0
 
− ρn[w(˜ a) − ˜ a]=−
 
β˜ aα+1R − ρn˜ a − π0
 
=0
where the last equality follows from (10). Therefore, the number of entrepreneurs is opti-
mal, and the full-information equilibrium is eﬃcient.
The equilibrium outcome we have described in this section is only one of many that can
occur. We have chosen it partly for simplicity, but partly because of the stark diﬀerences
that will exist between it and equilibria under asymmetric information discussed below.
As mentioned, if we had assumed that w (q) < 1 in (7), the set of workers who opt for
the entrepreneurial sector would fall along an interval of dimension 1−˜ a in the interior of
the quality distribution. Of course, higher-quality workers would be matched with higher-
entrepreneurs, and the equilibrium outcome under full information would still be socially
optimal.
10 Alternatively, dividing through by ρ would yield the surplus in present value terms. Since
workers get paid in the ﬁrst period, their surplus occurs then, while entrepreneurs’ surplus
occurs in the second period.
134. Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information
In this case, both a and q are private information. All workers who are employed in the
entrepreneurial sector obtain a common wage rate w, while all active entrepreneurs face a
common interest rate r. We begin with a general overview of the relationships that must
hold in equilibrium before turning to the qualitative features of equilibria.
Equilibrium Relationships
Consider ﬁrst the decision of workers to seek employment in the entrepreneurial versus the
traditional sector. Suppose workers believe—correctly in equilibrium—that the probability
of being employed in the entrepreneurial sector is e. All entrepreneurs will oﬀer the same
wage rate w in equilibrium since all workers have the same expected quality from the point
of view of entrepreneurs. Given w, the expected income of workers in the entrepreneurial
sector is ew. Since a worker of quality q can receive a wage of q in the traditional sector,
the cutoﬀ quality of workers by (5) is ˜ q = ew. All workers with q<˜ q—those with
the lowest quality—choose the entrepreneurial sector regardless of the parameters of the
problem. This is in contrast with the social optimum achieved with full information where a
segment of higher-quality workers will generally be attracted to the entrepreneurial sector.
Each entrepreneur also takes e as given. Recall from (1) that the probability of success
for an entrepreneur depends on qα, which cannot be observed here. When an entrepreneur
hires workers, those workers are selected randomly from the pool of available workers with
q ∈ [0, ˜ q], so E[qa] is the same for all entrepreneurs. Given e and the uniform distribution
of workers, E[qa]i sg i v e nb y :
(11) E[qa]=E [qα|q  ˜ q]=
1
˜ q













Expected proﬁts for this entrepreneur can therefore be written, using (2), as:




14This assumes that all entrepreneurs who choose to become active can receive a loan at
the rate r. We return later to the issue of whether there can be credit rationing in this
context, which would complicate matters considerably.
Each active entrepreneur can be thought of as choosing a wage rate to maximize prof-
its, given e. All entrepreneurs who become active oﬀer the same wage rate w in equilibrium,
as we shall conﬁrm. Moreover, workers will be indiﬀerent among active entrepreneurs since
they are paid the wage w in advance, so are not aﬀected by bankruptcy. Let m be the
number of active entrepreneurs. Since there are n˜ q workers in the entrepreneurial sector
and since each entrepreneur hires n workers, the employment rate e is given by:












For the case in which m<˜ q, there is unemployment (e<1) and we have by (5) and (14),
˜ q = ew = mw/˜ q. Therefore, the labor force in the entrepreneurial sector and the rate of
employment can be expressed respectively as ˜ q =
√
mw and e =
 
m/w. This implies
that the quality of the marginal worker with full employment and unemployment may be
written:




w if m = w
√
mw if m<w
Banks can observe neither a nor q. Assuming that projects are allocated randomly
among banks, the interest rate they oﬀer will be r = ρ/p by (4), where p is the expected











where a is the average quality of active entrepreneurs, discussed below. Expected proﬁts










2 (R − rnw)i fm<w
15Finally, we can use these expressions for expected proﬁts to determine the surplus
accruing to society from a given allocation of resources. Note that inactive entrepreneurs
(who obtain reservation proﬁts π0) and workers who remain in the traditional sector earn
no surplus. Moreover, workers who enter the entrepreneurial sector but are unemployed
produce nothing. (If there were credit rationing, active entrepreneurs who are unable to
obtain a loan would earn no surplus if there is ex post immobility between the two sectors.)
Let A and Q be the respective sets of entrepreneurs and workers in the entrepreneurial













where, recall, m is the number of entrepreneurs and p is the expected probability of success
of all active entrepreneurs. Since, e˜ q = m and r = ρ/p, social surplus can be written, using
(15) and (16), as:

























We turn now to the determination of the two key endogenous variables in the model,
the wage rate (which determines the number of workers who opt for the entrepreneurial
sector) and the number of entrepreneurs.
Determination of the Wage Rate
Consider ﬁrst the wage rate preferred by any given entrepreneur. Using (13), the value of
w that maximizes the proﬁts of an entrepreneur of any ability, given the employment rate
e, is the solution to the following problem:
max
{w}
wα · (R − rnw)
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions and (4), the solution, denoted   w,i sg i v e nb y :






which is independent of the ability level of the entrepreneur. The second-order conditions
are satisﬁed given our assumption that α<1. Starting at w = 0, proﬁts will initially rise
16with w and eventually reach a peak at   w, assumed to be at   w<1s ot h a tw eh a v ea n
interior solution. The intuition here is that the rise in w attracts better quality workers,
which increases the probability of success, but also increases labor costs. Given that p is
concave in q, the latter eventually oﬀsets the former.
Denote by we the market clearing, or equilibrium wage rate, that is, the wage rate
such that e =1 .G i v e nm, the market clearing wage will be we = m, where the number of
workers just equals the number of entrepreneurs, ˜ q = m. Whether involuntary unemploy-
ment exists depends upon the relative size of we and   w.I f  w>w e = m, entrepreneurs
will bid up the wage rate above the market clearing level, attracting excess workers into
the entrepreneurial sector and generating involuntary unemployment. On the other hand,
if   w  we = m, the wage rate will be bid up only to we by competition for workers, so
there will be full employment. Consider the consequences for entrepreneurial proﬁts of
each outcome in turn.
Unemployment Case:   w>w e = m
In this case, the market wage is   w given by (19) and p is given by the second row of (16).


























where both p(a,m)a n d  w(a,m) are increasing in a and m.
The expected proﬁts of an entrepreneur of ability a c a nb ew r i t t e na sf o l l o w s ,u s i n g






(R − rn  w)
Using (21), this yields:












17where   π(·) refers to expected proﬁts when the wage rate is   w. This function for expected
proﬁts is increasing in all three arguments, a, a and m.
Full Employment Case:   w  we = m




Expected proﬁts of an entrepreneur of ability a can immediately be written, using r = ρ/p












In this case, πe(·), expected proﬁts when w = we,i si n c r e a s i n gi na and a, but the eﬀect
of m is ambiguous.
T h eN u m b e ro fA c t i v eE n t r e p r e n e u r s
Given that expected proﬁts are increasing in ability a with or without unemployment, there
is a cutoﬀ ability level ˜ a such that all entrepreneurs with a  ˜ a become active and the
remainder obtain their reservation proﬁts π0. Then, the number of active entrepreneurs
is m =1− ˜ a, and given the uniform distribution that we have assumed, their average
(expected) ability is a =( 1+˜ a)/2, so
(24) m =2− 2a
Recall from (21) that the proﬁt-maximizing wage rate   w depends on a and m.T h e r e -
fore, whether   w  we = m depends on a. In particular, using (21) and (24), we obtain
that:







> (2 − 2a)
1−α
The left-hand side of (25) is increasing in a, while the right-hand side is decreasing. More-
over, at a = 0, the right-hand side exceeds the left-hand side. Therefore, there will be a








=( 2− 2a )
1−α
18For a  a ,   w  we (there is full employment), and vice versa. It must be the case that
0 < a  < 1 (since the right-hand side is less that the left-hand side at a = 1). Note that
a  1/2 since if m =0 ,a =1 /2. In what follows, we shall assume that a  > 1/2 to allow
for the possibility that there is full employment. If a  < 1/2, a would always exceed a  so
there would always be involuntary unemployment.
Whether the equilibrium involves full employment or unemployment depends on the
relationship between a and a . In turn, the market wage w as well as the expected proba-
bility of success p and expected proﬁts π depend on this relationship. We can summarize





m if a  a 














































where   w(a,m) is given by (21), a  is given by (26) and m =2− 2a by (24).
It remains to determine a, the average quality of entrepreneurs, which depends upon
how many entrepreneurs become active. For the marginal entrepreneur, π(˜ a,a)=π0.
By (27.3), for a>˜ a,w eh a v eπ(a,a) >π 0 since π(a,a)i si n c r e a s i n gi na, conﬁrming
our presumption that active entrepreneurs are those such that a  ˜ a. In characterizing
the number of active entrepreneurs, we can focus on the expected proﬁt function for the
marginal entrepreneur, deﬁned as ˜ π(a) ≡ π(˜ a,a).
Using (27.3), we obtain












































The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (29) is positive since ∂π/∂˜ a>0. The second term,
∂π/∂a, is initially positive and then becomes negative, as diﬀerentiation will conﬁrm.
Moreover, at a =1 /2a n da =1 ,˜ π(a) = 0. A typical shape for the ˜ π(a) function might be
single-peaked as shown in Figure 1.11
Interior equilibrium values for a will be those such that ˜ π(a)=π0. Figure 1 depicts
possible equilibria. For given values of π0, there are generally two interior equilibria, one
stable and the other unstable. The stable one is denoted a∗, and is to the left of the peak
of the ˜ π(a) curve. The other equilibrium au is unstable: for a>au, entrepreneurs will
exit causing a to rise, and vice versa. That implies that the two stable equilibria will be
the interior one at a = a∗ and the corner equilibrium a = 1 (where there are no active
entrepreneurs).12 Depending on the size of a relative to a , the stable equilibrium may
involve unemployment. The higher the value of π0, the higher will be a∗,a n dt h em o r e
likely will there be unemployment in equilibrium.
The Possibility of Credit Rationing
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) found that credit rationing could arise when projects were pooled
by their expected return (pR), which was exogenously given. In the de Meza and Webb
(1987) case where projects were pooled by their return R and the distribution of the prob-
ability of success p across entrepreneurs was given, credit rationing could not arise. Our
model is an extension of the de Meza-Webb model to allow for p for a given entrepreneur
to be endogenously determined by the quality of workers hired. It turns out that in this
case, credit rationing might arise. We simply show that possibility here without exploiting
its consequences for the form of equilibrium achieved and its eﬃciency properties.
11 Twice diﬀerentiating (28) with respect to a, we obtain that for a>a , d2˜ π/da2 < 0. However,
for a<a , the sign of d2˜ π/da2 is ambiguous. Diﬀerentiating (28) with respect to a also reveals
that ˜ π(a) can be increasing at a = a  as shown in Figure 1. In fact, the slope of ˜ π(a) will
generally be discontinuous at the point a = a , but it can either rise of fall discontinuously.
12 Of course, if π0 is very high, the only equilibrium will be one in which there are no en-
trepreneurs. In Figure 2, the π0 curve lies above the peak of the ˜ π(a) curve. We are ruling
this out as being not interesting for our purposes.
20Consider ﬁrst the marginal entrepreneur. Using ρ = r p by (4) and the expressions
















where, in equilibrium, ˜ π(a,r)=π0. Suppose we focus on a stable interior equilibrium,
which requires that ∂˜ π(a,r)/∂a>0. Diﬀerentiating condition ˜ π(a,r)=π0, we obtain:
da
dr












where the sign follows from the stability condition and the fact that ˜ π(a,r) in (30) is
decreasing in r. Intuitively, an increase in the interest rate pushes the lowest-ability en-
trepreneurs out of the sector and increases the average quality of those remaining, a.
Next, turn to the banks. The expected proﬁt per unit of lending is ΠB = p r − ρ.




















2 − ρ if a>a 
Credit rationing can only occur if an increase in the interest rate r causes bank expected
proﬁts to fall. Given that a is increasing in r as shown above, a necessary condition for this
is that ∂ΠB/∂a<0. From (31), we ﬁnd by diﬀerentiation that for the full employment
case where a  a , ∂ΠB/∂a<0i fa>1/(1 + α), which is clearly possible. Similarly,
in the unemployment case, we obtain that ∂ΠB/∂a<0i fa>2/(2 + α), which is again
possible. Thus, unlike in the de Meza-Webb case, credit rationing could occur in our model.
Intuitively, p can fall in a since lower-quality workers are left in the entrepreneurial sector
when the number of entrepreneurs decreases (a increases). Exploring the consequences
of that would be rather complicated and would take us too far aﬁeld from our present
purpose, so in what follows we rule out credit rationing.
To summarize the results of this section, equilibrium in the asymmetric-information
case will have the following features. The highest-ability entrepreneurs and the lowest-
quality workers will enter the entrepreneurial sector, in contrast with the full-information
21case. As well, workers will be randomly assigned to entrepreneurs contrary to the eﬃcient
matching of the full-information case. All entrepreneurs will pay a common wage rate,
which will be paid up-front, and a single interest rate facing all ﬁrms. There will generally
be multiple equilibria, unless π0 is high enough to rule out an entrepreneurial sector entirely.
Two equilibria will be stable and one unstable. The stable equilibria will include one
interior one and one corner solution in which there are no entrepreneurs. The interior
stable equilibrium may or may not involve involuntary unemployment.
5. Eﬃciency and Policy with Asymmetric Information
In this section, we study the optimality properties of equilibrium outcomes with asymmet-
ric information in credit and labor markets. Our main interest will be in stable interior
equilibria with and without unemployment. We begin by investigating the eﬃciency of
market equilibria, and then look at the consequences for government policy.
Local Eﬃciency Properties of Equilibria
Recall the expressions for social surplus S in (18). Rewriting these using the fact that








1+α(2 − 2a)α − π0 − (1 − a)ρn
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where   w in the case of unemployment is given by (21), with m =2−2a. The eﬃciency of
the equilibrium outcomes can be investigated by considering the eﬀects on social surplus of
incremental changes in a and, in the case of an unemployment equilibrium, in   w.C o n s i d e r
the unemployment case ﬁrst, concentrating on the interior equilibrium (a<1).
Unemployment Equilibrium: 1 > a>a 
In this case, S depends on a directly and also indirectly via   w(a). Consider the two eﬀect
in turn. Diﬀerentiating the second row in (32) partially with respect to a, we obtain, after












− 4 − α
 
ρn  w<0
where the sign follows from the fact that a>1/2. Then, diﬀerentiating S with respect to
  w and using (27.2), (24) and (19), we obtain:
(34)
∂S
∂   w
 







Thus, (33) and (34) indicate that an unemployment equilibrium is ineﬃcient. If a and
  w could be manipulated separately, a should be reduced (the number of entrepreneurs
increased) and   w should be increased (more high-ability workers should be attracted into
the entrepreneurial sector).
However,   w depends on a through (21). Substituting m =2− 2a in (21) and diﬀer-
entiating with respect to a, we obtain:






This relationship between w and a applies only for a>a .F o r a  a ,f u l le m p l o y m e n t
exists, so w = m =2− 2a implying that w is declining in a. The two panels of Figure
2 depict possible cases for the relationship between the w and a, depending on whether
a   2/(2+α). If a   2/(2+α), the market wage is monotonically decreasing in a, while
if a  < 2/(2+α), the wage rate is hump-shaped in the range where there is unemployment.
These ﬁgures will be useful again below.
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which reduces to the expression in the text using (19).









∂   w
∂   w
∂a
Given (33) and (34), this will be unambiguously negative if ∂   w/∂a<0, which will be the
case if a>2/(2 + α). That is, an increase in the number of entrepreneurs would increase
eﬃciency. Otherwise, it will be ambiguous. We return below to how policy might be used
to enhance eﬃciency.14
Full Employment Equilibrium: 1/2 < a  a 
With full employment, a has only a direct eﬀect on S in the ﬁrst row of (32). Diﬀerentiating



















we − (1 + α)  w
 
 0
since we >   w. Thus, there may be too few or too many entrepreneurs in the full-
employment equilibrium.
These eﬃciency results contrast with those of de Meza and Webb (1987) who show
that in the absence of heterogeneous worker quality, there are unambiguously too many
entrepreneurs in equilibrium (a is too low in our notation). In the de Meza-Webb model,
there is an adverse selection eﬀect that allows low-quality entrepreneurs to take advantage
of a common interest rate, and too many do so. That eﬀect is present in our model as
well, but in addition the quality of workers hired in the entrepreneurial sector tends to
14 Note that an increase in the number of entrepreneurs will increase employment, even if it
also increases   w.T os e et h i s ,u s em =2− 2a and (21) to give:
e =
 
















Diﬀerentiating this with respect to a,w eo b t a i nde/da<0.
24be too low. Increasing the number of entrepreneurs is a way of attracting higher-quality
workers, but at the expense of taking lower-quality entrepreneurs. Either of those eﬀects
can dominate.
The above welfare eﬀects are local ones. Unfortunately in our model, social surplus
in (32) is not globally concave. Diﬀerentiation with respect to a indicates that d2S/da2 is
generally of ambiguous sign. Therefore, there are various possibilities for global optima,
as our discussion next illustrates.
Policy Implications
In the above analysis, we considered a hypothetical perturbation of a, and thus   w in the
unemployment case, around the equilibrium. The government cannot control a directly
since that is determined by the decision of entrepreneurs to become active. Instead, in
a decentralized market economy, the government can inﬂuence equilibrium outcomes by
intervening with taxes or subsidies. Two kinds of policy instruments might be used to in-
ﬂuence a and   w: a tax or subsidy on entrepreneurs who become active and a tax or subsidy
on wages. We begin by analyzing how these policy instruments aﬀect equilibrium values of
a and   w. Then, we turn to the eﬀect of policies on the social surplus, S. In evaluating the
potential for policy intervention, it is useful to note that since the government can observe
neither the quality of workers nor the ability of entrepreneurs, the full-information opti-
mum cannot be achieved. In particular, workers cannot be optimally matched to ﬁrms,
and nothing can be done to avoid the fact that it will be the lowest quality of workers
that will be attracted to the entrepreneurial sector. A more far-reaching analysis might
consider ways in which information about q and a could be elicited, such as by signaling
or ex ante monitoring.
Eﬀect of Policies on Equilibrium Outcomes
Let τ be a subsidy on entrepreneurs, and σ a wage subsidy. Then, (2) can be revised to
give the after-subsidy expected proﬁt of an active entrepreneur:
π = E[p](R − (1 − σ)nwr)+τ  π0
where E[p]=βa(ew)α/(1 + α) by (12) and r = ρ/p by (4). The equilibrium value of a
25is determined by the zero-net-proﬁt condition of the marginal entrepreneur. Revising (28)


























+ τ if a>a 
where ˜ π(a,σ,τ)=π0 in equilibrium. Equation (37) determines how a, and therefore ˜ a
responds to changes in σ and τ. Let us focus on the stable interior solution in Figure 1.
Stability requires that ∂˜ π/∂a>0 for both the full employment and unemployment cases.














which imply that ∂˜ a/∂σ < 0a n d∂˜ a/∂τ < 0 as well. An increase in either subsidy
increases the number of active entrepreneurs by attracting more low-ability ones into the
entrepreneurial sector.
Next, consider the wage rate. In the full employment case, the market-clearing wage is
w = m =2−2a as before. An increase in the number of entrepreneurs reduces a and there-
fore w. Lower-ability entrepreneurs and lower-quality workers enter the entrepreneurial
sector.
With unemployment, the preferred wage rate in (19) becomes:
(19 )   w =
αRp
(1 − σ)(1 + α)ρn
which, combined the expression for p in (16), then leads to a revised version of (21):















In equilibrium, a will be determined by ˜ π(a,σ,τ)=π0 in (37). Combining the second row
in (37) with (21 ) yields   w as a function of the equilibrium value of a and the subsidies:










∂   w
∂a
< 0,
∂   w
∂τ
< 0,
∂   w
∂σ
> 0
We are now in a position to investigate the eﬀect of subsidy policy on social surplus.
We begin with local welfare analysis, evaluating the eﬀect of introducing small subsidies
starting at laissez-faire equilibria. Then, optimal policies are considered.
The Eﬃciency Eﬀect of Incremental Policies
Social surplus is again given by (32), where now a and   w depend on τ and σ.W ec o n s i d e r
the eﬀect of changes in τ and σ on S in the unemployment and the full-employment
equilibria in sequence.
Unemployment Case
Diﬀerentiating the second row of (32) with respect to a and   w and using (27.2) and (19 ),












(1 − σ)ρn  w +2 τ
(42)
∂S
∂   w
 
   
 
a
=[ α − (1 + α)σ]
mρn
2
At the no-subsidy equilibrium with τ = σ = 0, these reduce to (33) and (34) with ∂S/∂a<
0a n d∂S/∂  w>0.
Consider now the eﬀect of small changes in subsidies on social surplus. Diﬀerentiating
























∂   w
d  w
dσ
where d  w/dτ and d  w/dσ include both the direct eﬀects of these policies on   w by (40)
and the indirect eﬀect through changes in a using (38). These imply d  w/dτ  0a n d
15 We are assuming an interior solution with   w<1, although technically a corner solution with
all workers choosing the entrepreneurial sector is possible.
27d  w/dσ > 0. Suppose we evaluate this starting at the no-intervention equilibrium. Then,

















Thus, starting from the laissez-faire unemployment equilibrium, welfare will be unambigu-
ously increased if we impose a small subsidy on wages.
Full Employment Case
In this case, S depends only on a. Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst row of (32) with respect to a









− αpR + σρn
(2a − 1)(2 − 2a)
a
+ τ
This again reduces to (36) and has an ambiguous sign in the no-intervention case.

















Both of these have ambiguous signs at the no-intervention full-employment equilibrium.
Optimal Policies
Suppose now that the government can choose subsidies σ and τ to maximize social surplus.
It turns out that the social optimum may involve either full employment or unemployment
depending on the parameters of the problem.
If the optimum involves unemployment, the government will choose τ and σ such
that in (43), ∂S/∂τ = ∂S/∂σ =0 . T h i sw i l lb et h ec a s ei f∂S/∂a =0a n d∂S/∂  w =0 ,
where these are given by (41) and (42). This leads to a straightforward characterization





Then, setting (41) to zero and using this expression for σ (which implies that σ/(1−σ)=α),









(1 − σ)ρn  w +2 τ =0 = ⇒ τ>0
28where the sign of τ follows from the fact that a>1/2. Thus, if unemployment exists in
the optimum, both the wage subsidy and the subsidy on entrepreneurs should be positive.
On the other hand, if the optimum involves full employment, S depends only on a.
Optimal subsidy policies require setting (44) to zero, and this requires only one policy
instrument. It is apparent that either τ or σ can be used. Here, the sign of the optimal
subsidy is ambiguous. Suppose, for example, that τ is used. Then, its sign depends on the
sign of the ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side of (44), or equivalently the right-hand
side of (36), which is ambiguous. This parallels the result found above for incremental
policy changes.
Whether there is full employment or unemployment in the optimum depends upon
the parameters of the problem. To see this, consider how S varies with a.I nt h ec a s eo f
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+( 2− 2a)ρn +2 π0
As a approaches a , we move from one case to the other. Let a → a 
+ denote a approaching
a  from above (in the unemployment region), and vice versa for a → a 
−. Then we obtain









= αρn  w>0
Therefore, the slope of S(a) increases discontinuously at a = a , implying that S(a) cannot
be concave. Moreover, whether the slope of S(a)a ta = a  is positive or negative depends
upon the parameters of the problem, as inspection of (46) and (47) indicates.
16 This is just the ﬁrst equation in footnote 11. Note that we are assuming that σ is chosen
optimally so that ∂S/∂  w = 0. Therefore, we need not take account of changes in   w as a
changes.
29Suppose ﬁrst that S(a) is single-peaked in a. Then, if ∂S/∂a<0a ta = a , it will be
optimal to induce a reduction in a thereby moving into the range of full employment. By
t h es a m et o k e n ,i f∂S/∂a>0, there will be unemployment in the optimum. From (46) and
(47), we can see that ∂S/∂a will be positive at a = a  if π0 is large enough. A large value
of π0 will make it more diﬃcult to attract entrepreneurs into the sector, thereby increasing
the chances of an unemployment equilibrium.
However, it is quite possible that S(a) is not single-peaked. That is, lima→a 
+dS/da
may be positive, while lima→a 
−dS/da is negative. This can occur if the wage function is
as depicted in Panel B of Figure 2. Then, a reduction in a will cause S to rise. However,
starting at a = a ,i n c r e a s e si na will also cause   w to rise in this case. This increase in
  w together with the increase in a could cause the right-hand side of (46) to rise. There
would be local optima in both the full-employment and unemployment ranges of a,a n d
either one could be the global optimum.
Thus, policy prescriptions depend on the parameters of the problem: with unemploy-
ment both σ and τ should be positive, while with full employment only one of σ or τ
is needed and it could be positive or negative. Indeed, optimal policies are even more
ambiguous when we recall that the laissez-faire equilibrium could be a corner solution in
which no entrepreneurs are active. In this case, it will be necessary to impose suﬃciently
large subsidies to move the initial equilibrium to a stable interior one. To study this case
properly would involve an explicitly dynamic analysis.
6. Alternative Information Assumptions
In the previous analysis, we assumed that both worker qualities and entrepreneur abilities
were private information. This results in adverse selection in two markets, which leads to
various sorts of ambiguity: ambiguity about the possibility of unemployment, ambiguity
about policy prescriptions, and multiple equilibria. Moreover, equilibrium outcomes vary
considerably from the full-information case in terms of the quality of workers that opt for
the entrepreneurial sector, the number of entrepreneurs, and the mismatch between worker
quality and entrepreneurial ability. In this section, we relax the information assumptions
by allowing either a or q to be public information. In each case, we shall simply sketch
30the outlines of the analysis and summarize the results rather than providing a full-ﬂedged
treatment, which would be too space-consuming. The intuition will apparent given what
we have learned in the case already considered.
Entrepreneurial Ability Known
Suppose ﬁrst that a is public information, but q remains private. Since workers cannot
be distinguished, a common wage w will be oﬀered, and the expected quality of workers
employed by all entrepreneurs will be the same. Banks can oﬀer ability-speciﬁc gross
interest rates r(a)=ρ/p(a), where p(a) is given by the expression for E[p] in (12). The
expected proﬁt of a type-a entrepreneur then becomes:




where e  1 is the employment rate for workers who opt for the entrepreneurial sector.
As before, entrepreneurs take e as given and choose a wage to oﬀer. As we shall
see, each entrepreneur will have a diﬀerent preferred wage rate, but competition among
entrepreneurs will cause a common wage rate to emerge (which may or may not clear the
labor market). To see this, consider the population of active entrepreneurs. Suppose that
all entrepreneurs with a  ˜ a will become active, and let   w(a) be the wage oﬀered by a
type-a entrepreneur. Workers who seek a job in the entrepreneurial sector will apply to
the entrepreneurs oﬀering the highest   w(a). We assume, critically, that there is ex post
immobility not only between sectors as above, but also from one entrepreneur to another
once a job application is made. This implies that competition for workers will equalize
  w(a) among entrepreneurs, so we can simply write   w in what follows. Given the probability
of employment e,w o r k e r sw i t hq  e  w are attracted to the entrepreneurial sector, and all
are indiﬀerent among the active entrepreneurs.
Suppose as before that there are m active entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, all en-
trepreneurs will perceive the same e (although out of equilibrium they may well perceive
diﬀerent ones), and that will be given by (14) as before. Moreover, given that   w is the same
for all entrepreneurs—the highest one preferred by any active entrepreneur—the equilib-
rium wage rate will again be given by   w with ˜ q =
√
m  w if there is unemployment by (15),
and we = m if there is full employment. Unemployment will occur if   w>w e as before.
31Consider now what determines the common value of   w that is oﬀered by all en-
trepreneurs in the unemployment case. Given e, an entrepreneur of ability a prefers the








which is increasing in a. The entrepreneur with a = 1 prefers to oﬀer the highest wage
rate, and all other entrepreneurs will be obliged to follow. Therefore,   w =   w(1). As long
as   w>m , that will be the prevailing wage rate. In eﬀect, perfect information in capital
markets intensiﬁes competition for workers thereby pushing up   w.U s i n ge =
 
m/  w,t h e
above equation for entrepreneur a = 1 becomes:






The characterization of equilibrium is similar to that for the asymmetric-information
case considered earlier. The market clearing wage rate will be we = m,w h e r em =2−2a.
There will be a value of a,s a ya , such that   w = we. The equilibrium wage rate will be
w = we if a  a ,a n dw =   w if a>a ,w h e r e  w is given by (49). We can proceed as above
to derive expected proﬁts for the marginal entrepreneur, ˜ π(a), the analog of (28). The
analog of Figure 1 applies here as well. There will generally be two interior equilibria, only
one of which is stable. The other stable equilibrium is that at which a =1w h e r et h e r ea r e
no active entrepreneurs. In the stable equilibrium, there may be either full employment or
unemployment.
It is apparent that this case has similar qualitative features to the asymmetric-
information case analyzed earlier. In both cases, there may be full employment or involun-
tary unemployment. Workers are paid a common wage and are drawn from the bottom of
the quality distribution. There is, however, no adverse selection problem in credit markets
in the sense that the interest rate can be conditioned on the ability of entrepreneurs. This
implies some diﬀerences in the equilibrium possibilities under the two regimes. It will be
the case that a  will be lower and   w higher in this case than in the case where both a and
q are private information. This is a consequence of the fact that the wage rate is bid up to
32that preferred by the highest-ability entrepreneur. If there is full employment, wage rates
will be the same for a given number of entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, although one might
expect there to be fewer entrepreneurs ﬁnanced in this case given the absence of adverse
selection, that turns out not to be unambiguously the case. Nonetheless, from a social
point of view, the number of entrepreneurs is now unambiguously too low (a is too high)
if there is full employment: the tendency for over-entry due to adverse selection in credit
markets (the De Meza-Webb eﬀect) no longer applies.
Worker Quality Known
In this case, worker quality can be observed by all agents, but each entrepreneur’s ability
is private knowledge. This information structure leads to a somewhat more complicated
outcome. Since the qualities of the workers hired by a given entrepreneur are known to
the bank, the interest rate charged can reﬂect those qualities. Consider an entrepreneur
that hires n(q) workers of quality q,w h e r e
 
n(q)dq = n as before. The gross interest rate
charged to this entrepreneur is r = ρ/p(q)w i t hp(q)=βaqα,w h e r eqα =
 
n(q)qαdq/n.
Since worker quality is known, a wage function w(q) can be oﬀered. The expected proﬁt
of a type-a entrepreneur is then given by:


















where π is common to all entrepreneurs.
With worker quality observable to entrepreneurs, there will be full employment. But,
wage setting is more complicated than before since wages can be quality-speciﬁc. First
note that oﬀering wages equal to each worker’s quality cannot be an equilibrium in the
entrepreneurial sector. That is because for all entrepreneurs, the same uniform quality of
workers would maximize proﬁts aπ when w = q, so wages of this worker would be bid up.
Competition among entrepreneurs implies that w(q) must be such that all entrepreneurs
will be indiﬀerent about the quality of workers that they hire. To determine the equilibrium
pattern of wages that will ensure that, consider a type-a entrepreneur. Given the wage
function w(q), that entrepreneur would choose n(q) to maximize π in (50) subject to
 
n(q)dq/n =1 .I fw(q) were such that the entrepreneur were indiﬀerent about the quality
33of workers hired, the ﬁrst-order conditions for all q would be satisﬁed with equality, yielding:






(βRqα − λ) ∀ q
where the value of λ is the same for all entrepreneurs. Since α<1, w(q) is increasing and
strictly concave: w (q) > 0 >w   (q). Assuming that workers are drawn from the interior
of the quality distribution, there will be two values of q, denoted q and q with q>q ,s u c h
that w(q)=q,a n dw(q)=q.17 Figure 3 illustrates.
For worker qualities q such that q <q<q, the wage payment w(q) >q ,s ot h e s e
workers are attracted into the entrepreneurial sector. Workers with q<qor q>q (if there
are any of the latter) will choose the traditional sector. Then the supply of labor in the
entrepreneurial sector, denoted s, will be given by s(a,πa)=n(q − q). where q and q  1
are deﬁned as above. Note that by (51), s(a,πa)i si n c r e a s i n gi na and decreasing in πa.I n
terms of Figure 3, an increase in a shifts the curve w(q) up, while an increase in πa shifts
it down.
Since the number of entrepreneurs is m and each entrepreneur hires n workers, equi-
librium in the labor market requires s(a,πa)=nm.G i v e n m, πa adjusts to satisfy this
equilibrium condition. Since, s(·) is monotonic in m, we can solve the equilibrium condition
for the value of πa that ensures labor market clearing, πa(a,m), where πa(·)i si n c r e a s i n g
in a and decreasing in m.
Since entrepreneurs that are not active obtain π0, the proﬁt of the marginal en-
trepreneur will satisfy π0 =˜ aπa(a,m). Entrepreneurial expected proﬁts are increasing
in a, so it will be the case as before that entrepreneurs with ability a  ˜ a will become
active, while the remainder will choose the alternative option. Therefore, m =1− ˜ a and
a =( 1+˜ a)/2. Using these relationships, the condition determining the quality of the





,1 − ˜ a
 
= π0
The value of ˜ a,o re q u i v a l e n t l ya =( 1+˜ a)/2, that satisﬁes this equation will be uniquely
determined.
17 If w(1)  1, it will be the case that q = 1, since the upper bound of q is unity. Conversely,
if w(0) > 0, we have q = 0, which is the lower bound of q.
34Given that entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent about the quality of workers they hire, and
workers are indiﬀerent to whom they work for, there will not be perfect matching of a and
q. Indeed, we might expect that matching is random. That being the case, there will be
three sources of ineﬃciency. There will be a tendency for too many entrepreneurs to enter
due to the standard adverse selection eﬀect on credit markets. There will be a mismatch of
workers with entrepreneurs. And, the set of workers by quality may not be correct. Unlike
i nt h ec a s ew h e r eq is private, here higher-quality workers will generally be attracted into
the entrepreneurial sector. However, it is not clear whether the average quality of workers
is too high or too low.
7. Concluding Comments
The results in this paper are obviously model-speciﬁc. Nonetheless, they are suggestive
and do indicate that once one combines adverse selection in labor markets with those
in credit markets, matters become much more complicated and policy prescriptions less
clearcut. Multiple stable equilibria exist, one of which can be a corner solution in which
no entrepreneurs are active (and therefore no surplus is generated). Even if the market
equilibrium is interior, it may involve involuntary unemployment, or even credit rationing.
Depending on the equilibrium, eﬃciency consequences, and therefore policy prescriptions,
may diﬀer. If there is involuntary unemployment, a presumption exists that there will be
too few entrepreneurs and therefore too much unemployment, although even that depends
on parameter values. In a full-employment equilibrium, no such presumption exists. Unlike
the case with adverse selection applying only in credit markets, there may be too few or
too many entrepreneurs. Adverse selection in credit markets tends to induce too many
low-ability entrepreneurs to enter since the interest rate they face is too generous given
their ability. At the same time, the entry of more entrepreneurs mitigates the adverse
selection problem in labor markets which results in too-few high-quality workers.
There are a number of ways in which the model could be fruitfully enriched, albeit at
the further expense of simplicity A straightforward extension would be to allow ﬁrms to
vary the number of workers they employ, as in Weiss (1980). As he shows, ﬁrms will tend
to hire too few workers because of adverse selection, leading to an argument for subsidizing
35employment in the entrepreneurial sector. A more ambitious extension would be to have
both old ﬁrms and new ﬁrms competing with one another both for workers and in output
markets. Assuming that established ﬁrms have informational advantages over new ones,
one would expect to obtain a case for diﬀerential tax treatment of the two sorts of ﬁrms,
although to which type’s advantage may not be obvious. Finally, we have assumed in
our basic model, following the literature as well as our own assumptions, pooling on both
labor and credit markets. One can imagine extending the model to allow for the possibility
of separating ﬁrms either on the basis of information acquired from ex ante monitoring
by banks or signaling by entrepreneurs, or on the basis of other ﬁrm characteristics or
behavior, such as ﬁrm size or the ability to provide collateral.18 These extensions would
complicate the analysis considerably.
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